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Abstract The aim of this study is to better understand why
public officials and business employees engage in corrup-
tion. Insight into individual-level explanations for corrup-
tion was obtained with the aid of a self-report survey. The
results suggest that the most indicative factors of whether
or not individuals are corruption-prone are as follows: the
moral conviction they have to refrain from corruption;
perceptions of whether their colleagues approve of and
engage in corruption; and difficulties experienced in com-
plying with the rules on corruption. This result pattern was
identical for public officials and business employees alike,
and as a consequence, for both sides of corrupt acts. The
latter indicates that the same motives may not only underlie
corruption in both private and public sectors, but also the
act of corruption in its active and passive forms. The results
of the current study do not provide strong support for the
assumption that economic considerations—expected costs
and benefits—are crucial in predicting corruption. Based
on the findings that norms and the perceived opportunity to
comply are dominant factors in explaining corruption, this
article focuses on the practical implications for the devel-
opment of anti-corruption strategies within both public and
private sectors.
Keywords Active and passive bribery  Corruption 
Incentives  Motives  Opportunity  Personal norms 
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Introduction
Corrupt transactions between public officials and business
employees distort fair competition, impair equal access to
public goods and services, and, perhaps most damaging,
undermine government legitimacy (Chan 2000). Although
its extent may differ from one society to another, corrup-
tion threatens all countries (Mousavi and Pourkiani 2013).
The most widely used indicator of the level of a country’s
public sector corruption is the Corruption Perceptions
Index, annually published by the nongovernmental orga-
nization Transparency International. According to this
index, the public sector of the Netherlands is one of the
least corrupt countries. In 2014, worldwide, only seven
nations were considered less corrupt (Transparency Inter-
national 2014). Nevertheless, the Netherlands has also been
confronted with serious cases of public officials being
bribed (Huberts and Nelen 2005).
At the end of 2013, a high-ranking Dutch official was
sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment for bribery, as well
as forgery and money laundering. The former deputy was
found guilty of accepting large sums of money from private
companies in return for preferential treatment (Kreling and
Logtenberg 2013). The accused himself, however, seemed
convinced of his innocence. He claimed that his conviction
was ‘‘a political settlement,’’ ‘‘a miscarriage of justice’’ and
defended himself by stating that ‘‘corruption and crime are
alien to me’’ (Graanoogst 2013). According to Langsted
(2012), this is not unusual for people who engage in cor-
ruption. He states that very rarely recipients or providers of
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dubious gifts tend to view their behavior as corrupt. In the
Dutch court, the judge spoke harshly about the deputy’s
failure to acknowledge the moral reprehensibility of his
actions. This lack of acknowledgment was considered by
the judge to be an aggravating factor. It could, however,
also be regarded as an important cause of why individuals
engage in corruption.
The aim of this study is to examine why public officials
and business employees engage in corruption. The causes
of corruption are studied by many academic disciplines, as
for instance economics, political science, social psychol-
ogy, and public administration (de Graaf et al. 2010).
However, the vast majority of empirical literature focuses
on finding explanations on the national level (Dong et al.
2012; Svensson 2003) and, to a lesser extent, on the
organizational level (de Graaf 2007). This predominant
nation-based focus together with broad, firm-level ante-
cedents of corruption is referred to as ‘‘striking’’ by Collins
et al. (2009, p. 89). According to them, participation of
firms in corruption is fundamentally driven by the deci-
sions of executives and, consequently, by decisions of
individuals.1 Moreover, while studies on the national and
organization levels may offer explanations for differences
in corruption between countries and between organizations,
they do not offer insight into why certain individuals—
given specific country and organizational conditions—en-
gage in corruption, while others do not. In addition, soci-
etal or organizational factors are generally extremely
stable. As a result, this knowledge is less likely to lead to
the development of effective tools for mitigating corruption
within countries and organizations. For instance, notions
that corruption is less prevalent in countries with a long
tradition of democracy (Treisman 2000), or more common
in family-controlled businesses (Fogel 2006; La Porta et al.
1999), renders little opportunity for developing tools that
may reduce corruption within newly democratic nations or
within family-run businesses. Investing in understanding
why people make corrupt decisions may, within a given
country or organization, ultimately lead to practical tools
preventing prone individuals from engaging in corruption.
However, investigating individuals’ motives for corruption
is a difficult endeavor. Collins et al. (2009) point out three
key issues: corruption is difficult to define, difficult to
observe, and difficult to measure. Moreover, an overarch-
ing framework incorporating individual-level factors pro-
posed by different disciplines explaining why individuals
engage in corruption is currently lacking.
Defining and Conceptualizing Corruption
Farrales (2005, p. 1) states that ‘‘in fact, the most enduring
aspect of the literature has been the continued difficulty in
defining and conceptualizing corruption.’’ The definition of
corruption most widely used in scientific literature is the
abuse of public power for private benefit (Aguilera and
Vadera 2008; Tanzi 1998). This is a rather broad definition
that includes a wide array of unethical and criminal acts,
such as conflicts of interest, forgery, and embezzlement. To
make progress in the explanation of corruption, according
to Collins et al. (2009), research should focus on a rather
narrow form of corruption in a limited context. The focus
of this study is therefore on a specific form of corruption,
on behavior that is closely related to the legal term bribery.
As Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) have noted, there is some-
times an overlap between illegal conduct and unethical
conduct, with bribery being both unethical and illegal
(Pendse 2012). Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) define unethical
behavior as ‘‘any organizational member action that vio-
lates widely accepted (societal) moral norms’’ (p. 2). The
example given by Kish-Gephart et al. (2010, p. 2) of
unethical behavior that overlaps with illegal behavior is
stealing, since stealing ‘‘is considered to be unethical
because it breaches widely accepted societal norms. It is
also illegal.’’ The same consideration, as pointed out by
Pendse (2012), applies to bribery. Moreover, bribery is a
form of behavior that is criminalized not only in national,
but also in international legislation: The United Kingdom
Bribery Act and The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are
important examples of the latter (Jordan 2011). A question
raised by Smith et al. (2007) is whether the distinction
between unethical and illegal behavior is important when
empirically studying behavior. In their study on acts of
corporate crime that are unethical, the above academics use
the following definition: ‘‘an unethical decision is either
illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community’’
(Jones 1991, p. 367). They point out that illegal and
unethical actions frequently share common characteristics
and can be investigated empirically in combination. From a
criminological perspective, according to Heath (2008),
‘‘moral’’ and ‘‘legal’’ are viewed on a continuum, the pri-
mary difference being that moral norms are enforced
through informal sanctions, while legal norms are enforced
using the power of the state. However, as pointed out by
Smith et al. (2007), it is questionable whether criminal
sanction within corporate settings is effective. According to
their study on why managers fail to do the right thing,
threat of legal sanctions may be ineffective in keeping
potential offenders from engaging in unethical and illegal
conduct. This is in line with a recent systematic review on
the effectiveness of formal legal strategies to curtail
1 One could argue that studies on firms’ involvement in corruption
that are based on surveying or interviewing the firms’ managers (see
for instance Collins et al. 2009; Svensson 2003) actually approach
firm-level corruption from an individual-level perspective.
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corporate crime, which showed hardly any significant
deterrent effects of legal and punitive sanctions on indi-
vidual offending (Simpson et al. 2014).
As mentioned above, to gain more insight into
explanatory factors of corruption, research should focus not
only on a rather narrow form of corruption, such as bribery,
but also on corruption in a limited context (Collins et al.
2009). According to Rose-Ackerman (1997), corruption
primarily arises in the interaction between the public and
the private sector. She points out that ‘‘whenever a public
official has discretionary powers over distribution to the
private sector of a benefit or cost, incentives for bribery are
created’’ (Rose-Ackerman 1997, p. 31). When such a cor-
rupt transaction occurs, one can distinguish between active
and passive bribery (Huberts and Nelen 2005). Individuals
who try to influence professional decisions by offering,
giving, or promising money, goods, or services engage in
active bribery. Individuals who request, accept, or expect
gifts in exchange for the abuse of their discretionary
powers commit passive bribery. In bribery involving a
business employee and a public official, it is most likely
that the former commits active bribery, and the latter
engages in passive bribery.
Currently, the literature contains remarkably few
empirical studies that take into account both actors’ reasons
for their engagement in bribery. According to Beets (2005),
the focus in the international business context is more on
the active side: the suppliers of bribes to public officials.
Beets (2005) therefore proposes to take a closer look at the
motivation of public officials who accept or demand bribes.
In contrast, Martin et al. (2007) state that understanding
bribery from the perspective of the firms supplying bribes
is virtually absent. Likewise, Vogl (1998) argues that
media and most international institutions have focused
more on the passive side: public officials who abuse their
office for private gain. Irrespectively, analyzing the
behavior of one side seems insufficient (Dong et al. 2012).
The current study therefore focuses on the motives of
public officials as well as business employees for engaging
in corrupt transactions, in order to shed light on both sides
of the coin.
The Empirical Study of Corruption
The empirical study of corruption is challenging, no matter
whether the actions of business employees, public officials,
or both form the object of the study. Per definition, per-
petrators of crimes try to cover up their involvement and
are generally unwilling to provide evidence. The study of
corruption is hampered by additional challenges, since
corruption, certainly if it concerns bribery, is generally a
consensual crime, of which its victims are often unaware
(Rabl and Kuehlmann 2008). Consensual crimes, in which
two or more parties covertly agree to the transgression,
tend to stimulate secrecy (Thachuk 2005). The possibility
of speaking up places the perpetrators in a prisoners
dilemma in which pointing the finger at one—whether
pointed at oneself or at the accomplice—automatically
implies incriminating the other. The outcomes are most
favorable for both if neither unveils the pact. In addition, it
is unlikely that the victims of such corrupt deeds would
speak out, as they are generally oblivious to their unlaw-
fully disadvantaged position: when a business firm gives a
bribe to an official in a public procurement in exchange for
the contract, the other unsuccessful bidders can at best
guess that a secret transaction was responsible for the
rejection of their bid. More at a distance, also the state and
its tax payers could be considered victims of bribery con-
cerning the public sector (Osborne 2013). These ‘distant’
victims are even less likely to be aware of the illegitimate
exchange. Victimization surveys are therefore not likely to
be very informative (Croall 2007).
Despite these difficulties, scholars do, with the aid of
several methods, make empirical contributions to the body
of knowledge about the causes of corruption. The most
widely used method is based on experts’ perceptions about
the prevalence of corruption (Tanzi 1998), of which the
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International
2014) is the best-known example. However, according to
Tanzi (1998, p. 122), ‘‘These indexes reflect perceptions
and not objective and quantitative measures of actual
corruption.’’ Moreover, considering the aggregate nature of
the data, it is difficult to assess the relation between cor-
ruption and individual actors (Svensson 2003). Within the
academic literature, the study of corruption cases also
forms a popular research method (Andvig et al. 2001).
Corruption cases offer the opportunity to intensively study
actual corrupt transactions and the situations under which
they occurred (de Graaf and Huberts 2008). However, case-
study analyses often consist of only a few cases and are
solely based on the cases that came to the attention of
regulators, while most corrupt transactions are likely to go
unnoticed. Solely relying on the information from detected
corruption cases might render a skewed picture of cor-
ruption. It therefore seems important to complement case-
study analyses with information gathered via other meth-
ods. Only a few corruption studies use experimental
designs (Köbis et al. 2015; Sequeira 2012). Experimental
designs test causal relations between potential causes and
corruption. They are, however, generally conducted in
laboratories; artificial environments that do not always
mimic real-life situations. According to Andvig et al.
(2001), the most promising method for empirically study-
ing corrupt behavior is by using self-reports. This method
is gaining popularity within empirical corruption literature.
Both Sides of the Coin: Motives for Corruption Among Public Officials and Business Employees
123
Although survey methods render the risk of social desir-
ability bias, it seems that even when the stakes are high, as
for instance in application procedures, people confess to
wrongdoing when filling out integrity tests (Pinto et al.
2008). However, due to the sensitivity of the topic, the risk
of social bias is of special concern in ethics research
(Fukukawa 2002). To control for social desirability
response tendencies, Torfason et al. (2013) therefore
included a social desirability scale in their study measuring
individuals’ attitudes towards bribery. As pointed out by
Andvig et al. (2001), individuals in both the public and
private sectors have shown willingness to answer questions
about corrupt behavior. Self-report studies—that include a
social desirability scale to correct for social desirability
bias—therefore could prove a useful method for measuring
corruption in studies aimed at finding explanations for
corrupt transactions that involve public officials and busi-
ness employees.
Explaining Corruption and Integrating
Perspectives
Recent empirical findings concerning why individuals
engage in corruption not only suggest that individual
characteristics are strongly related to corrupt behavior, but
also indicate that corruption is determined by social influ-
ences (Dong et al. 2012; Powpaka 2002; Rabl and Kuehl-
mann 2008; Tavits 2010). From a theoretical point of view,
several disciplines—predominantly social psychology,
criminology, and economics—have put forward different
frameworks that may explain, from an individual per-
spective, why individuals engage in corruption (Aguilera
and Vadera 2008; Andvig et al. 2001; Ashforth and Anand
2003; Dimant 2013; Powpaka 2002; Prabowo 2014; Rabl
and Kuehlmann 2008; Wikström 2004). Each of these
frameworks contributes to the understanding of corruption,
but none of them seem to capture the whole picture,
making the other frameworks redundant. Therefore, to gain
better insight into why individuals engage in corrupt
transactions, offering an integrated model would appear
warranted. Social-psychological theories propose norms,
both personal and social, as essential features in explaining
corrupt behavior (Beck and Ajzen 1991; Cialdini and
Goldstein 2004). These theories generally also incorporate
the perceived opportunity to comply (Ajzen 1985, 1991;
Bandura 1977). The criminological theories uniquely add
the opportunity to violate as a dominant building block
(Coleman 1987). Economic theory suggests that incentives,
both positive and negative, are critical in explaining
behavior (Becker 1968; Paternoster and Simpson 1996;
Simpson et al. 2002). Thus far, no empirical study has
combined and tested these elements simultaneously to
determine which of them are critical in explaining
corruption.
From a social-psychological viewpoint, norms are vital
in explaining and predicting human behavior in specific
situations (Ajzen 1991; Asch 1956; Milgram 1963;
Schwartz 1977). Many general social-psychological theo-
ries and models have incorporated norms, e.g., the theory
of planned behavior (Ajzen 1985, 1991), the focus theory
of normative conduct (Kallgren et al. 2000), and the norm
activation model (Schwartz 1977). With regard to norms, a
distinction can be made between a person’s own norms,
personal norms, and the norms outside of the self, social
norms. As a result of the ethical gravity of corruption,
personal as well as social norms are anticipated to be
important explanatory factors for why people engage in or
refrain from this behavior.
Personal norms refer to feelings of a ‘‘moral obligation
to perform or refrain from specific actions’’ (Schwartz and
Howard 1981, p. 191). Personal norms are an individual’s
deeply rooted and relatively stable moral convictions,
which are used as personal standards to evaluate behavior
(Onwezen et al. 2013; Schwartz 1977). According to the
norm activation model, personal norms are activated when
a person is aware of the negative consequences for others
when engaging in unethical behavior, and when he or she
feels responsible for these negative consequences
(Schwartz 1977; Steg and Groot 2010). Denkers et al.
(2013) examined whether personal norms are related to
people’s tendency to break or adhere to the rules in the
workplace. They found that people with weak personal
norms, who did not feel a strong moral obligation to
comply with the rules at work, indeed had a stronger ten-
dency to engage in rule-breaking behavior, while people
with strong personal norms, who believed rule violation to
be more immoral, tended to adhere to the rules. Wenzel
(2004) showed that personal norms of tax honesty were
negatively related to people’s engagement in tax evasion.
Regarding the importance of personal norms in explaining
corruption, Powpaka (2002), who applied the theory of
planned behavior (Ajzen 1985, 1991) to bribe-giving
behavior, found that people’s attitude towards bribery was
affected by the degree to which they perceived corruption
as unethical. Indeed, Beck and Ajzen (1991), who postu-
lated the theory of planned behavior, suggest including
personal feelings of moral obligation to refrain from
behavior in studies aimed at explaining unethical actions.
Further empirical evidence for the importance of personal
norms as an explanatory factor for corruption was provided
by Tavits (2010), who found that public officials who
defined corruption as morally wrong were less likely to
engage in bribery.
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H1 Personal norms towards corruption are negatively
related to corruption.
Social norms, in contrast to personal norms, do not
directly refer to personal normative convictions, but to an
individual’s perception about the beliefs and behavior of
relevant others (Cialdini et al. 1990). This perception is an
important link between individuals and their environment
(Wikström 2004). A person’s social environment can be a
powerful motivator for (non)normative behavior (Cialdini
2003; Cialdini et al. 1990). With regard to corruption, Den
Nieuwenboer and Kaptein (2008) argue that social factors
can inhibit, enable, or stimulate individuals to engage in
corruption (Den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein 2008). Robin-
son and O’Leary-Kelly (1998) indeed found that individ-
uals’ rule-violating behavior at work was related to norm
violation engaged in by their co-workers. While the theory
of planned behavior (Ajzen 1985, 1991) only focuses on
subjective norms, which refer to the perceived likelihood
that significant others approve or disapprove of engaging in
specific behavior, the focus theory of normative conduct
(Kallgren et al. 2000) postulates that normative behavior is
not only influenced by individuals’ perception of what is
commonly (dis)approved of—injunctive norms—but also
by people’s perceptions of what is commonly done—de-
scriptive norms. Research consistently shows that the
beliefs and behavior of others, or someone’s perception
about these beliefs and behavior, have a major impact on
why people participate in counter-normative behavior
(Cialdini et al. 1990; Keizer et al. 2008; Reno et al. 1993).
Empirical research confirms that both kinds of social norms
seem to affect whether individuals engage in or refrain
from corruption. Rabl and Kuehlmann (2008) found that
people’s desire to act corruptly was weaker if others,
important to the actor, did not accept corruption. Tavits
(2010) found that people were less susceptible to corrup-
tion when they perceived that their peers did not engage in
corruption.
H2 Social norms towards corruption are negatively
related to corruption.
Personal and social norms influence the motivation for
committing unethical or even criminal behavior. However,
for this behavior to occur, offenders need not only to want
to commit this kind of behavior, they also need to be able
to do so. Motivation and opportunity are key variables in
criminological theories on causes of criminal behavior in
general and white-collar crime in particular (Benson and
Simpson 2015; Coleman 1987). As pointed out by Cole-
man (1987): ‘‘If there is no opportunity, there will be no
crime’’ (p. 424). Hence, from a criminological viewpoint,
the opportunity to engage in certain behavior is an essential
component in any potentially unethical or criminal act
(Pendse 2012). Opportunity is also a prominent factor in
studies aimed at explaining corruption (Aguilera and
Vadera 2008; Pinto et al. 2008). Personal and social norms
may withhold people from corruption, but even among
those who are motivated to commit corruption—due to
weak personal norms with regard to corruption and the
perception that corruption is popular among their peers—
the opportunity to engage in corrupt acts remains a vital
precondition. Because criminological theories generally
assume that people are predominantly self-interested
(Agnew 2014; Becker 1968; Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990), these theories tend to look at the absence or pres-
ence of opportunities to commit crime. If the opportunity
arises, people, according to this line of thinking, are likely
to commit crime. In contrast, social-psychological theories,
such as in the norm activation model, generally tend to
look at why people engage in prosocial behavior, or obey
the law (Schwartz 1977; Steg and Vlek 2009; Tyler 2006).
These theories generally operationalize opportunity as the
individual’s perception of the ease or difficulty of per-
forming the prosocial behavior. Examples of such concepts
are perceived behavioral control and self-efficacy (Ajzen
1991; Bandura 1977; Fishbein and Cappella 2006). Both
types of perceived opportunities, the perceived opportunity
to violate and the perceived opportunity to comply, may be
responsible for people’s engagement in corruption. Cor-
ruption in organizations in this study is assumed to be more
likely when the rules regarding corruption are both easier
to violate and compliance is more challenging.
H3 The perceived opportunity to violate corruption rules
and a lack of perceived opportunity to comply with cor-
ruption rules are positively related to corruption.
(Ab)using opportunities is a key element in rational
choice theories of crime, which is a popular explanation for
white-collar crimes such as corruption. White-collar crime
is generally viewed as a purposive action which is the
outcome of rational decision-making processes in which
offenders weigh the costs and benefits of criminal behavior
in a specific situation. Due to the context of doing business
and the intellectual capabilities of corporate and govern-
mental officials, white-collar crimes are generally seen as
being more planned and more based on conscious decision
making than most ‘ordinary’ street crimes (Benson and
Simpson 2015; Shover and Hochstetler 2005). According
to this economic approach, cost and benefit assessments
play a decisive role in explaining why individuals engage
in or refrain from rule-violating behavior (Becker 1968).
Individuals’ engagement in corruption may also be moti-
vated by incentives, both by the perceived costs and ben-
efits (Andvig et al. 2001; Dimant 2013; Prabowo 2014;
Shover and Bryant 1993; Svensson 2005). Costs include
the probability of detection and the severity of sanctions
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(Becker 1968; Klepper and Nagin 1989). Expected gains in
economic theory are usually of a monetary nature (Cole-
man 1987; Pendse 2012). Decisions to engage in corrupt
transactions may, however, also include non-monetary
considerations, such as excitement, pleasure, or status
(Huberts and Nelen 2005; Langsted 2012; Prabowo 2014).
While Carrillo (2000) argues that individuals’ engagement
in corruption is also influenced by the size of bribes, Rabl
(2011) did not find a relationship between the size of the
bribe and corrupt action. In the theoretical literature, eco-
nomic considerations are the most common explanation for
corruption on the individual level (Andvig et al. 2001;
Dong et al. 2012; Tavits 2010).
H4 Perceived costs are negatively related to corruption;
perceived benefits are positively related to corruption.
In brief, whether individuals engage in or refrain from
corruption may be influenced by several factors on the
individual level. These different factors are derived from
theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence emerging
from three separate disciplines. While empirical evidence
was found for the importance of all four factors, none of
the studies examined all four motivational factors simul-
taneously, in order to determine which of them play a key
role in explaining corruption. A model used in practice by
enforcement agencies in the Netherlands, to better under-
stand and influence regulatory violations and financial–
economic crimes in organizations, consists of these same
four motivational factors: personal norms, social norms,
perceived opportunities to violate and to comply, and
incentives (Goslinga and Denkers 2009; Platform Bijzon-
dere Opsporingsdiensten 2007). The model proposes that
these four central motivational mechanisms explain rule
violation or compliance in organizations (CTPA 2010;
Platform Bijzondere Opsporingsdiensten 2007). While all
four are assumed to influence rule-breaking behavior, the
model presupposes a sequence of importance of these
motives. Both personal and social norms are presumed to
contribute most to the explanation of rule-violating
behavior, followed by the perceived opportunity to violate
and to comply, and by incentives (CTPA 2010, Platform
Bijzondere Opsporingsdiensten 2007). Self-report surveys
which are focused on regulatory non-compliance in private
organizations, provide support for the model’s assumptions
(Denkers et al. 2013; Goslinga and Denkers 2009; Platform
Bijzondere Opsporingsdiensten 2007). With regard to
corruption, thus far, no empirical studies have been con-
ducted that incorporate all four motives to determine which
of them are best able to explain individuals’ engagement in
corruption. The current study investigates if the four pro-
posed motives explain corruption in the order that was
found with regard to organizational members’ rule-violat-
ing behavior more generally. The analyses will include a
search for the unique and combined influences of motives
on both sides of corruption—among both public officials
and business employees.
H5 In combination with the other motives, normative
considerations contribute most to explaining corruption.
Method
Procedure and Respondents
A questionnaire study was published on a website that
manages online surveys and research panels (www.fly
catcher.eu2). A selection study was performed first to select
panel members: who either worked in the public or the
private sector; who frequently interacted professionally
with people employed in the other sector; and who carried
out tasks over which they had discretionary powers. Par-
ticipation was voluntary and anonymous. The Ethics
Committee for Legal and Criminological Research of the
Faculty of Law of the VU University approved this study
and—given the fact that fully disclosing the purpose of the
study beforehand could alter participants’ responses—
waived the need for obtaining written consent from par-
ticipants. Given the sensitivity of the topic, rather than
specifying that a study was conducted on corruption that
was carried out by the department of Criminal Law and
Criminology, the introduction stated that a study was
conducted on integrity at work on behalf of the Faculty of
Law. To counteract order effects, the questions were
administered in a randomized order. To prevent missing
data, responding to all questions was required. Completing
the questionnaire took respondents about twenty minutes.
In the selection study, 2644 panel members participated,
with a response rate of 68 %. Of these participants, 551
were selected for the main study. The final sample con-
sisted of 202 public officials and 200 business employees.
The response rate to the main survey was 73 %. 53 % of
the participants were male. The respondents’ age ranged
from 17 to 70 years, with a mean age of 43.4
(SD = 11.00). Compared to the general Dutch population,
people with a higher education and income level were
overrepresented.
2 The Flycatcher panel consists of approximately 16,000 people who
agreed to participate regularly in online surveys. On average, panel
members receive eight surveys a year. In exchange for completion of
questionnaires, respondents receive a small reward in the form of
points, which can be converted into gift vouchers. The Flycatcher
panel meets the ISO quality standards for social science research and
is used exclusively for research and not for any other purposes, such
as sales or direct marketing. Panel members may terminate their panel
membership at any time. Panel members cannot select the type of
surveys for which they wish to be invited.
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The percentage of respondents occupying a management
position was 31 % in the private sector and 21 % in the
public sector. Regarding the frequency of professional
public–private interactions, 39 % of the business employ-
ees in the sample interacted with officials on a daily basis
and 61 % at least weekly; 42 % of the public officials
interacted with business employees on a daily basis, 40 %
at least weekly, and 18 % at least monthly. Activities
carried out in public–private interactions comprised
awarding contracts, enforcement and inspection, spatial
planning, and the purchase of goods or services, among
others.
Measures
Two versions of the questionnaire were developed, one for
the private sector, the active side of corrupt transactions in
this study, and one for the public sector, the passive side.
Both versions were kept as similar as possible. Since cor-
rupt public–private interactions occur within an organiza-
tional context, all questions were directed at respondents’
working situation.
Dependent Variables
Corruption was operationalized by describing bribery-re-
lated behavior, without using the words ‘‘corruption’’ or
‘‘bribery.’’ To measure this behavior, two scales were used,
one measuring bribery-related intentions and the other past
bribery-related behavior. Bribery-related intentions were
measured by three items (‘‘In the foreseeable future I can
imagine that at my work a situation could arise in which I
offer/give/promise (for the private sector); ask/accept/ex-
pect (for the public sector) money, goods or services to a
public official (private sector); to someone from outside the
organization (public sector) in exchange for preferential
treatment.’’ on a 7-points scale (1 ‘‘not at all’’–7 ‘‘to a great
extent’’). Past bribery-related behavior was also measured
by three items (‘‘At my work it has happened to me that I
offered/gave/promised (private sector); asked/ac-
cepted/expected (public sector) money, goods or services
to a public official (private sector); someone from outside
the organization (public sector) in exchange for preferen-
tial treatment.’’ on a 7-points scale (1 ‘‘never’’–7 ‘‘often’’).
Because the two scales were strongly correlated (r = .73,
p\ .001), they were combined into one scale measuring
proneness to corrupt transactions. The average score across
the six items was computed, which formed an internally
reliable scale, and indicates that most respondents were not
prone to corruption as operationalized in this study
(a = .94; M = 1.36, SD = .800). Because the data were
not normally distributed, the scale was dichotomized to a
corruption-prone category (consisting of respondents who
scored a four or higher on the intention scale and a two or
higher on the behavior scale) and a non-corruption-prone
category. Twenty percent of the business employees and
22 % of the public officials were categorized as corruption-
prone.
Independent Variables
Personal norms were measured by nine items (e.g., ‘‘I
would feel guilty if I gave… a public official money, goods
or services in exchange for preferential treatment.’’ (private
sector); ‘‘… someone from outside of my organization
preferential treatment in exchange for money, goods or
services.’’ (public sector),‘‘I feel personally responsible for
ensuring that my colleagues comply with rules on…
offering or giving gifts.’’ (private sector); ‘‘… accepting
gifts.’’ (public sector), ‘‘I think it is overdone to have rules
about accepting or offering gifts to public officials.’’ (both
sectors). All items were scored on a 7-point scale (1
‘‘completely disagree’’–7 ‘‘completely agree’’). Mean
scores for the nine items were computed, which formed an
internally reliable scale and indicated that most respon-
dents had strong personal norms regarding corruption, and
thus felt morally obliged to refrain from corruption
(a = .77; M = 5.51, SD = .948).
Social norms refer to perceptions of what important
others think and do within a particular context. Since
corruption occurs within the occupation context, it was
assumed that the most important referents for respondents’
own behavior regarding corruption would be that of close
colleagues. Social norms were measured by seven items
(e.g., ‘‘I am convinced that my close colleagues would feel
guilty if they gave… a public official money, goods or
services in exchange for preferential treatment.’’ (private
sector); ‘‘… someone from outside our organization pref-
erential treatment in exchange for money, goods or ser-
vices.’’ (public sector), ‘‘I am convinced that my close
colleagues sometimes give… money, goods or services to
public officials in exchange for preferential treatment.’’
(private sector); ‘‘… someone from outside our organiza-
tion preferential treatment in exchange for money, goods or
services.’’ (public sector). The items were scored on a
7-point scale (1 ‘‘completely disagree’’–7 ‘‘completely
agree’’), which formed an internally reliable scale
(a = .82). The mean score indicates that respondents’
social norms with regard to corruption were rather strong
(M = 5.19, SD = .948).
Perceived opportunity to violate corruption rules was
measured by four items (e.g., ‘‘The rules on bribery at my
work are easy to avoid’’ (for both sectors), ‘‘If I wanted
to…. I could easily persuade a public official to make
decisions based on improper grounds.’’ (private sector);
‘‘… I could make decisions at my work based on improper
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grounds.’’ (public sector) on a 7-point scale (1 ‘‘completely
disagree’’–7 ‘‘completely agree’’). The items formed an
internally reliable scale (a = .71). The average score of the
scale indicates that the rules regarding corruption were,
according to the respondents, not very easy, nor very dif-
ficult to violate (M = 3.16, SD = 1.368).
Perceived opportunity to comply with corruption rules
was measured by three items (e.g., ‘‘I find it difficult to
comply with bribery rules at my work.’’ (both sectors), ‘‘It is
clear to me which rules I must follow when doing business
with… public officials.’’ (private sector); ‘‘… people from
outside my organization.’’ (public sector). The items were
scored on a 7-point scale (1 ‘‘completely disagree’’–7
‘‘completely agree’’). The average score across the items
was computed, which indicated that, according to the
respondents, the rules regarding corruption were not very
difficult to comply with (M = 2.08, SD = 1.049). The items
measuring perceived opportunity to comply did not, how-
ever, form a very reliable scale (a = .58). In the introduction
section, a distinction is made between the perceived oppor-
tunity to violate corruption rules and the perceived oppor-
tunity to comply with corruption rules. These two types of
opportunity may, however, comprise different aspects of the
same underlying construct. To determine whether the seven
items measuring both types of perceived opportunity could
be combined into one factor reliably measuring perceived
opportunities to engage in corruption, an exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) was conducted. The results of the factor
analysis suggested that the items did not measure one
underlying variable, but, as expected, measured two distinct
factors, namely the perceived opportunity to violate, con-
sisting of four items, and the perceived opportunity to
comply, consisting of three items. The two types of oppor-
tunity were therefore treated as two separate factors in the
remainder of this article. Despite the low Cronbach’s alpha,
both types of opportunities were included in the subsequent
analyses. The necessary caution that must be exercised in
drawing conclusions regarding the importance of this factor
in explaining corruption-proneness as a result of the low
Cronbach’s alpha it exhibited is addressed in the discussion
section.
Costs of engaging in corruption consisted of two scales,
namely the perceived chance of detection and the severity
of punishment. Respondents were asked to assess both
(‘‘Imagine that it is discovered that you engaged in bribery.
In your opinion, is it likely that the following persons or
agencies would discover this, and how serious would the
negative consequences be, if the discovery was made by…
a direct colleague; a manager of your company; a colleague
of the public official; a competitor of your company; an
enforcement agency.’’ (private sector); ‘‘… a direct col-
league; a manager of your organization; a colleague of the
briber; a competitor of the briber; an enforcement agency.’’
(public sector). The items were scored on a 7-point scale (1
‘‘not likely at all’’/‘‘not serious at all’’–7 ‘‘very likely’’/
‘‘very serious’’), which formed an internally reliable scale
(a = .87). The mean score indicates that in the perception
of the respondents the costs of engaging in corruption were
relatively high (M = 4.72, SD = 1.177).
Benefits of engaging in corruption were measured by
asking the respondents to indicate how likely it was, in
their perception, that someone would initiate, or go along
with, a corrupt exchange (e.g., ‘‘How likely do you think it
is that… you might get preferential treatment from a public
official when offering him or her money, goods or ser-
vices.’’ (private sector); ‘‘… someone from outside your
organization would offer you money, goods or services to
receive preferential treatment.’’ (public sector) on a 7-point
scale (1 ‘‘very small’’–7 ‘‘very large’’) and the benefits this
would render the participant (e.g., ‘‘Engaging in bribery
render someone personal benefits,’’ ‘‘Engaging in bribery
would lead to financial gain,’’ ‘‘Engaging in bribery would
make my job more exciting,’’ ‘‘Engaging in bribery would
lead to fun and pleasure’’ (for both sectors) on a 7-point
scale (1 ‘‘completely disagree’’–7 ‘‘completely agree’’).
The items measuring perceived benefits formed an inter-
nally reliable scale (a = .80). The mean score indicates
that respondents did not assess the benefits of engaging in
corruption to be very high (M = 2.81, SD = 1.309).
Control Variables
Social desirability was measured to control for respon-
dents’ tendencies to deny undesirable beliefs or behavior.
Although the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
(Crowne and Marlowe 1960) has been widely used to test
for the presence of this type of response, the items of this
scale are rather general, for instance ‘‘I never hesitate to go
out of my way to help someone in trouble.’’ Because all the
questions in the current study were directed at people’s
working situation, and a scale that specifically aimed to
measure socially desirable response behavior with regard
to the work context was not found in the literature, a social
desirability scale was constructed. Social desirability was
measured by seven items (e.g., ‘‘I did not keep a promise
while at work.,’’ ‘‘I have violated a rule while at work.,’’ ‘‘I
benefitted from someone else while at work.,’’ for both
sectors) on a 7-point scale (1 ‘‘never’’–7 ‘‘often’’), which
formed an internally reliable scale (a = .86; M = 5.61,
SD = .995). The scores on the scale were reversed during
scale construction, so the average score indicates that
people responded in a rather socially desirable manner.
Background factors such as age, gender, and educational
level were measured as well and were included in the
analyses as control variables.
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Analysis
To estimate the degree of relationship between corruption-
proneness and the proposed motives, point-biserial corre-
lation coefficients were calculated, which is the value of
Pearson’s product moment correlation when one of the
variables is dichotomous and the other variables are mea-
sured on a ratio or interval scale (Kornbrot 2005). Next,
binary logistic regression analyses were performed to test
which of the proposed motives explained respondents’
proneness to corruption, and whether the effects of the
motives depended upon the respondents’ sector and side in
the corrupt transactions.
Results
The point-biserial correlation coefficients between the
proposed motives and corruption-proneness are depicted in
Table 1. The simple correlations show that all motives for
corruption were significantly related to corruption-prone-
ness,3 in the public and private sectors. In both sectors, the
corruption-prone respondents—who reported to have an
intention to engage in corruption and/or had done so in the
past—indicated that they felt less morally obliged to refrain
from corruption; perceived corrupt behavior to be more
approved of and more common among their close col-
leagues; regarded the rules on corruption as easier to vio-
late; and regarded the rules on corruption as more difficult
to comply with; perceived less costs of committing cor-
ruption; and expected more benefits of engaging in cor-
ruption than the non-corrupt respondents. The strength and
direction of the relationships between corruption-proneness
and the proposed motives confirm the first four hypotheses
of this study. Social desirability, however, also appeared to
be correlated with corruption-proneness rather strongly,
which suggests that respondents within the corruption-
prone category may have answered the questions more
truthfully than respondents who indicated to be unsuscep-
tible to corruption. Therefore, for both sectors separately,
partial correlations were calculated, which are the simple
correlation coefficients controlled for social desirability.
The partial correlations, depicted in Table 1 as well, show
that in the public sector, personal norms, social norms, and
the opportunity to comply are still related to corruption-
proneness in the expected direction, in contrast to per-
ceived costs and benefits, which do not appear to be related
to corruption-proneness after correcting for socially desir-
able response tendencies. The same results were found for
the private sector, with the only difference that in the pri-
vate sector, also the perceived opportunity to violate was
still significantly related to self-reported corruption-
proneness. Hence, in both sectors, the pattern of results
appears to be similar, which indicates that the motives that
are related to corruption may be identical in both sectors,
and therefore also with regard to both sides of corrupt
transactions. Because the pattern of results appears to be
the same in both sectors and to enhance statistical power,
the following analyses will be performed over both groups.
To statistically determine whether the same motives
explain public and private corruption or passive and active
corruption, the interaction terms between motives and
sector were separately entered into the regression analysis.
Social desirability was included as a covariate in all sub-
sequent analyses.
Binary logistic regression analyses were performed to
examine which of the motives were best able to explain
corruption-proneness. Three models were tested: the first
consists of background factors, the second adds motives,
and the third subsequently adds social desirability bias. The
first model consisted of the background factors gender, age,
Table 1 Simple and partial correlations between corruption-proneness and the proposed motives, disaggregated for the public sector (i.e.,
passive corruption) and the private sector (i.e., active corruption)
Public sector (n = 202) Private sector (n = 200)
Simple correlations Partial correlations Simple correlations Partial correlations
Personal norms -.30** -.21** -.39*** -.35***
Social norms -.29*** -.21** -.48*** -.46***
Opportunity to violate .20** .10 .34*** .32***
Opportunity to comply .30*** .19** .41*** .37***
Costs -.16* -.11 -.15* -.14
Benefits .23** .11 .16* .10
Social desirability -.35*** -.27***
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01; *** p\ .001
3 The results were also analyzed separately for corrupt intentions and
past corrupt behavior. Because the outcomes were very similar, the
two scales were merged into one. Hence, in the remainder of this
article, the results are analyzed and reported only for corruption-
proneness.
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and education level and the sector respondents were
employed in. As shown in Table 2, of the background
factors only gender explained respondents’ proneness to
corruption; females were less prone to corruption than
males. After entering the motives in the second model,
gender was unrelated to corruption-proneness, suggesting
that the initial effect of gender on corruption-proneness
was mediated by the motives. In the second model, social
norms, the perceived opportunity to comply, and personal
norms contributed most in explaining corruption-prone-
ness. Hence, the results suggest that the influence of per-
ceived opportunity to violate corruption rules and
assessments of costs and benefits on corruption was out-
weighed by the other motives. The third model examined
to what extent the results of the second model hold after
correction for the influence of socially desirable response
tendencies. Social desirability indeed seemed to explain
whether or not respondents reported to be corruption-
prone. However, with regard to the influence of the motives
on corruption-proneness, the pattern of results did not alter
after social desirability was included in the model. Hence,
irrespective of whether the outcomes were corrected for
social desirability bias, the most important explanatory
factors seemed to be respondents’ perceptions of what
close colleagues do and think one should do regarding
corruption, experienced difficulties in complying with the
rules on corruption and the moral conviction that one has to
refrain from corruption. These results confirm the fifth
hypothesis.
Sector, private or public, did not appear to explain
corruption-proneness in any of the three models, as can be
seen in Table 2, indicating that the inclination towards
corruption is equally strong in both sectors. However, this
does not necessarily mean that the motives explain cor-
ruption to the same extent within both sectors. To examine
if the sector, and therefore the side of corruption, deter-
mines the degree to which the motives influence engage-
ment in corruption, six interaction terms were calculated
between each of the motives and sectors. After the third
model as depicted in Table 2, forward stepwise selection
was used to investigate if any of the interaction terms
added to a better explanation of corruption-proneness. The
results showed that none of the interactions between sector
and the motives significantly contributed to the explanation
of corruption-proneness. This suggests that the motiva-
tional factors that explain corruption-proneness do not
seem to differ for business employees and public officials,
and as a consequence, nor for the active and passive sides
of a corrupt transaction—hence motivations for corruption
appear to be similar on both sides of the coin.
To explore if any interaction effects between motives
further contribute to explaining corruption-proneness, all
fifteen interaction terms between the six motives were
calculated. After the third model as depicted in Table 2,
forward stepwise selection was used to investigate if any of
the interaction terms added explanatory value. None of the
fifteen interaction terms were entered into the model,
which indicates that the direct effects of the motives on
Table 2 Binary logistic regression model: corruption-proneness (corruption-prone = 1, not corruption-prone = 0; n = 402)
Factor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Beta Wald Exp (B) Beta Wald Exp (B) Beta Wald Exp (B)
Gender -.667 6.414* .513 -.406 1.694 .666 -.480 2.279 .619
Age -.008 .508 .992 .018 1.524 1.018 .024 2.610 1.024
Education level -.166 3.341 .847 -.067 .364 .935 -.080 .474 .923
Sector -.133 .282 .875 .072 .045 1.074 .122 .128 1.130
Personal norms -.510 8.098** .600 -.439 5.703* .645
Social norms -.559 12.462*** .572 -.578 12.620*** .561
Opportunity to violate .174 1.702 1.190 .130 .914 1.139
Opportunity to comply .592 15.881*** 1.808 .530 11.990** 1.698
Costs -.014 .010 .986 -.048 .104 .953
Benefits .135 1.193 1.145 .049 .140 1.050
Social desirability -.478 9.119** .620
Overall fit model 1: -2 Log likelihood = 402.361; Cox and Snel R2 = .024; Nagelkerke R2 = .037.
Overall fit model 2: -2 Log likelihood = 304.526; Cox and Snel R2 = .235; Nagelkerke R2 = .366.
Overall fit model 3: -2 Log likelihood = 295.125; Cox and Snel R2 = .252; Nagelkerke R2 = .394.
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01; *** p\ .001
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corruption did not seem to be influenced by any of the other
motives included in this study.
Discussion
This study aimed at gaining better understanding of why, at
an individual level, business employees and public officials
engage in corrupt transactions. The findings show that all
proposed motives were related to self-reports of corruption-
proneness. However, those that seem to uniquely contribute
to whether individuals do or do not engage in corruption
were social norms, personal norms, and the perceived
opportunity to comply. Hence, perceptions of how close
colleagues behave and think one should behave regarding
corruption, the moral conviction that one has to refrain
from corruption, and the perceived opportunity to comply
with corruption rules best explained people’s propensity to
corruption. This pattern of results was identical for busi-
ness employees and public officials and, as a consequence,
for both sides of corruption. This indicates that the same
motives may not only underlie corruption-proneness in the
public and private sectors, but also corrupt behavior in its
active and passive forms.
Of the two proposed types of perceived opportunities,
the perceived opportunity to violate rules did not seem to
contribute to explaining corruption-proneness. This result
suggests that the operationalization of perceived opportu-
nity from the social-psychological point of view (Ajzen
1991; Bandura 1977), the opportunity to comply, might be
a better predictor of corruption than the operationalization
that is dominant within the criminological literature
(Coleman 1987). Hence, the criminological literature might
advance by specifically incorporating the opportunity to
comply within their models. The perceived opportunity to
comply scale utilized in this study exhibited a low Cron-
bach’s alpha. This warrants caution in interpreting the
results concerning this scale. Further research, including a
reliable measure of the perceived opportunity to comply,
would appear opportune. If such research renders compa-
rable results concerning the influence of the perceived
opportunity to comply on corruption-proneness, this could
prove to be an important theoretical and practical contri-
bution to the field of corruption. Within the criminological
literature, strong emphasis is placed on the importance of
the perceived opportunity to violate rules in explaining
white-collar crime; the perceived opportunity to comply
receives no attention within this literature. Also, from a
practical point of view, a focus on ‘making it easier to
comply’ may provide an effective tool for reducing cor-
ruption. That is, in trying to make corruption an impossible
option (e.g., by introducing a strict ‘‘four-eyes-policy’’),
within the daily office stress of trying to meet deadlines,
may make it impossible to adhere to the requirements that
were set out to diminish corruption. In contrast, by
designing non-corruption, or compliance in general, as the
easy option, for instance by providing automatic pop-ups
with clear instructions as an employee enters a delicate
form on the intranet, may facilitate compliance. However,
the results of the current study do not imply that the per-
ceived opportunity to violate is completely irrelevant, as
these perceptions were related to corruption-proneness,
especially in the private sector. The results suggest how-
ever that regarding corruption, as may very well be the case
for other forms of crime within organizations, other
motives seem to outweigh the influence of the perceived
opportunity to violate.
In addition, the results of the current study do not pro-
vide strong support for the assumption that economic
considerations, expected costs and benefits, are vital to
predicting corruption. Within scientific literature on
motives for corruption, in line with the rational choice
theory, economic considerations hold a dominant position.
In their review on corruption research, Andvig et al. (2001,
p. 51) conclude that ‘‘in recent years, economic explana-
tions of corruption have been the most cited and probably
also the most influential for policy formulations.’’ Eco-
nomic considerations were found to be related to corrup-
tion-proneness, but the influence of perceived costs and of
benefits was outweighed by personal norms, social norms,
and the perceived opportunity to comply. The model used
by enforcement agencies in the Netherlands to better
understand and influence rule-breaking behavior—that
consists of the same motivational factors and expects per-
sonal and social norms and perceived opportunities to
contribute most to the explanation of ruleviolation or
compliance in organizations (CTPA 2010; Denkers et al.
2013; Goslinga and Denkers 2009)—seems to offer good
starting points for studying not only why individuals
engage in rule-breaking behavior in general, but also why
individuals engage in corruption.
The results showed no significant interactions between
the motives in explaining corruption-proneness. Although
no such interactions were hypothesized, one could argue
for an influence on corruption of the interaction between all
four motives. For example, several theories predict an
interaction between norms and incentives in predicting
rule-breaking (Frey and Jegen 2001; Wikström et al. 2011).
These theoretical predictions often conflict, however. For
instance, Frey and Jegen (2001) state that both costs and
benefits may undermine a person’s intrinsic motivation to
comply, i.e., incentives can undermine the compliance
promoting influence of strong personal norms. In contrast,
Wikström et al. (2011) propose that deterrence would only
come into play among those whose morality does not offer
a constrained, i.e., perceived costs only have an influence
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on the behavior of people who can be characterized by
weak personal norms. The results of the current study do
not provide evidence for any of such notions; no interaction
effects were found between the anticipated incentives and
personal norms, social norms, or perceived opportunities.
This, however, does not rule out that these mechanisms do
exist. Statistical techniques might be insufficient to pick up
on such a minority in a sample consisting of 402 individ-
uals, as it is likely to be a rather small proportion of Dutch
business employees and civil servants who have weak
moral standards regarding corruption and who are simul-
taneously placed in corruption inspiring surroundings. The
results of the present study suggest direct effects of three
motives on corruption-proneness; the more each of these is
present, the larger the chance that an individual might
engage in corruption.
A better understanding of corruption appears to call for an
interdisciplinary approach (Dimant 2013). Up until now
however, there is a lack of communication between the
disciplines that study corruption (de Graaf et al. 2010). The
current study included motivational factors derived from
social-psychological, criminological, and economic theo-
ries, in a search for the factors that contributemost towhether
individuals engage in or refrain from corruption. In the lit-
erature, the economic approach to corruption is arguable the
most dominant (Andvig et al. 2001; de Graaf et al. 2010;
Dong et al. 2012; Tavits 2010). The current study however
suggests that a particular emphasis should be given to the role
of norms. While norms are extensively studied and have a
long history in social psychology (Cialdini et al. 1990;
Schwartz 1977), more recently, behavioral economics also
identified norms as an important cause for behavior. Gino
et al. (2009), for instance, looked not only at expected costs
and benefits, but also at the influence of social norms on
unethical behavior. They conclude that whether an individ-
ual engages in unethical behavior does not appear to depend
on costs/benefit calculations, but rather on the social norms
regarding unethicality.While social norms may as well have
a powerful influence on engagement in corruption (see also
Köbis et al. 2015) and could therefore be an important causal
factor on the individual level, scholars have also linked
corruption to factors on the level of the organization, such as
ethical leadership and ethical climate (Ashforth and Anand
2003). Currently, it is unclear if individual-level factors, such
as social norms, and organization-level factors, such as
ethical climate, have an independent effect on corruption, or
if the influence of ethical climate on corruption is for instance
mediated by social norms. Knowledge on this, however,
could yield important insights concerning the factors that are
most critical to intervene on in attempts to curb corruption.
In the case of the Dutch former deputy who was found
guilty of accepting bribes from eleven private companies,
the key motives found in the present study might have also
contributed to his endeavors. The judge blamed the deputy
for his failure to acknowledge the immorality of his actions
(Kreling and Logtenberg 2013). Shortly after the deputy
learned he was convicted to 3 years of imprisonment, he
indeed stated in an interview: ‘‘Also in hindsight, I do not
see any harm in it.’’(Kreling and Logtenberg 2013). The
judge seemed to consider this to be an aggravating cir-
cumstance, especially since the accused held a high-rank-
ing position in public office. The results of this study,
however, imply that it is precisely this lack of moral
awareness—weak personal norms—that may explain why
a person engages in corruption. According to the deputy
himself, there was no lack of moral awareness on his part,
but there was a flagrant lack of clear integrity rules for
public sector administrators. Moreover, he pointed out that
‘‘my colleagues also engage in a lot of sideline activities.’’
The deputy’s remarks suggest that he experienced a lack of
opportunity to comply, while, in his view, the actions he
engaged in were considered to be the social norm. The
statements surrounding this court case seem to underline
the outcome of the present study. Langsted (2012) came to
very similar conclusions after studying a renowned cor-
ruption case in Denmark against ‘‘the king of Farum.’’
According to Langsted (2012), the Danish mayor who was
sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment was not driven by
personal economic gain.4 The mayor stated on nationwide
television that ‘‘It is utterly absurd, I have done nothing
wrong’’ (Langsted 2012, p. 139). These findings are cor-
roborated by those from a study of Gopinath (2008) on
private corruption, in which he postulates that an individ-
ual’s inability to recognize a certain behavior as being
unethical can lead to unethical behavior without the person
being aware of it. This may also explain why individuals
who engage in corruption tend not to regard their own
behavior as corrupt (Ashforth and Anand 2003).
The results of the present study are based on a self-
report survey. This method is particularly suited to gain
insight into key correlates of individual corruption-prone-
ness. Self-report surveys on unethical or illegal behavior,
however, come with specific concerns. Due to social
desirability, self-reports may lead to underreporting of
unethical and illegal behavior. In the present study,
approximately 20 % of the survey respondents reported
that they had engaged in bribery-related behavior in the
past and/or had an intention to do so in the near future. This
seems to counter the assumption of underreporting and also
confirms the statement of Andvig et al. (2001) that people
in both the public and the private sector seem willing to
4 Also in the current study, financial gain did not seem to contribute
to respondents’ proneness to corruption, either in the public or in the
private sector. In the public sector, the only expected benefit that
contributed to corruption-proneness was excitement, while in the
private sector only status turned out to be an explanatory benefit.
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answer questions about corruption when a questionnaire is
backed up by authority, legitimacy, and anonymity. How-
ever, because social desirability bias remains a method-
ological concern in all ethics research (Fukukawa 2002), a
social desirability scale was devised and included in the
survey to control for social desirability bias with regard to
non-ethical behavior and beliefs in the occupation context.
Although social desirability bias seemed indeed to influ-
ence self-reports of corruption-proneness, it did not seem to
have a major impact on the outcomes; the pattern of results
did not change after the results were controlled for social
desirability bias. The results of the current study therefore
clearly suggest that self-report surveys are a promising
avenue for gaining a better understanding of why individ-
uals engage in corruption.
Corruption-proneness in this study was operationalized
by measuring both bribery-related intentions and past
bribery-related behavior. Both measures were strongly
correlated and the pattern of results for both dependent
factors was very similar. This is in line with a study of Rabl
and Kuehlmann (2008) on corruption in organizations, in
which they combined a self-report survey with an experi-
mental simulation design. As a result of their design, they
were able to measure participants’ intentions to engage in
corruption and the participants’ corrupt decisions. The
outcomes of their study suggest that corrupt intentions
were extremely strongly related to actual corrupt decisions.
It therefore seems logical to combine intention and
behavior when measuring individuals’ proneness to corrupt
transactions.
Self-report surveys are obviously not the only method of
gaining insight into why people engage in corruption, and
come with certain drawbacks. While self-report surveys
may provide insights into the key correlates of corruption,
they cannot identify causality. Only experimental studies
can determine whether the motives for corruption proposed
in this study actually cause corrupt behavior by individuals.
In addition, the use of questionnaire studies requires
determining in advance which factors might be explanatory
factors for corrupt behavior. Hence, with this method, it is
not possible to find explanations not previously envisioned.
There may be other important motives for corruption,
postulated by other theories and other disciplines, which
were not included in this study. A motive that, for instance,
may prove an important explanatory factor for corruption is
the use of neutralization techniques, such as claiming that
no harm or damage is done, that allow offenders to view
engagement in corruption as justified (Anand et al. 2004;
Sykes and Matza 1957). As pointed out by Coleman
(1987), neutralization techniques are not only after-the-fact
rationalizations, they can also comprise an integral part of
the offender’s motivation to engage in the act in question.
Furthermore, a distinction that is often made in corruption
literature but not in this study is whether the individual or
the organization is the beneficiary of the corrupt act (Smith
et al. 2007; Pinto et al. 2008). This same distinction is
made in the criminological literature with regard to occu-
pational crime, a corrupt offense committed by individuals
for themselves in the course of their occupations, and
corporate crime, a corrupt act committed in favor of the
organization (de Graaf et al. 2010). Perhaps, the motives
that underlie these two distinct forms of corruption are not
the same. To distinguish between these different forms of
corruption and exploring its underlying motives, case
studies can make a valuable contribution, as they offer the
opportunity to inductively gain insight into individual
characteristics and social factors surrounding corruption.
Furthermore, case studies, as opposed to self-report sur-
veys, are well suited to explore the dyadic encounter—as
well as the relationship before and after—between the
supplier and the receiver of a bribe, for instance, the
firmness of their relationship, the amount of trust, and
whether and how their relation changes as a result of the
secret pact (see for instance de Graaf and Huberts 2008).
Moreover, because of the court verdict, hardly any doubt
exists that knowledge is based on real corruption, as may
be the case when it concerns experiments or self-report
surveys. Although in this study corruption was opera-
tionalized by describing the behavior instead of using the
term itself, corruption is in essence an ambiguous concept
(de Graaf et al. 2010). It may be a matter of opinion
whether something is meant as a gift or as a reward in
exchange for a benefit. Self-report surveys, experiments,
and case studies combined, however, might counterbalance
the concerns connected to each research method individu-
ally. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the causes
of corruption on the individual level, findings obtained via
several research methods should preferably be combined.
Anti-corruption interventions should target the root causes
of corruption. Therefore, insight into the underlying causes of
corruption is essential for the development of strategies that
effectively reduce corrupt behavior. As was pointed out by
Dong et al. (2012), while not many studies have investigated
the causes of corruption from an individual-level perspective,
most of these studies assume that corruption results from cost/
benefit analyses of individual actors. If people indeed engage
in corruption when the benefits outweigh the costs, strategies
to curb corruption should attempt to influence the incentives
associated to corruption, for instance by increasing the prob-
ability of being caught and the severity of sanctions (Osborne
2013; Prabowo 2014). The current study however shows that
the influence of both costs and benefits was outweighed by the
other motives. Corruption-control initiatives that solely focus
on increasing the costs and decreasing the benefits of cor-
ruption might therefore not prove to be the most effective
ones.
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To effectively limit corruption on the individual level, it
might be more fruitful to target norms and the perceived
opportunity to comply. Personal norms, for instance, could
be strengthened by drawing organizationmembers’ attention
to their moral standards. In their experiments on dishonesty,
Mazar et al. (2008) found that reminding people about their
morality by making them sign an honor code reduced sub-
sequent dishonest behavior. To strengthen social norms
within organizations, it might be useful to invite communi-
cation within an organization about people’s standards
regarding corruption. Creating and strengthening an atmo-
sphere in which corruption is openly disapproved of and
refrained from by the vast majority of co-workers might be
effective in mitigating corruption. Such an intervention
however is only likely to have the desired effect in organi-
zations where social norms condemn corruption. Also, per-
ceived opportunities for engaging in corruption could be
diminished.Making the rules regarding corruption as easy as
possible to adhere to, for instance, by establishing clear-cut
rules and actively disseminating these rules throughout the
organization, may have a preventive effect. In disseminating
integrity rules, organizations should be careful not to flood its
members, but rather target personnel conducting corruption-
sensitive activities in situations to which these integrity rules
are applicable, for instance by providing automatic pop-ups
that explain the applicable rules and procedures in a clear and
concise manner.
Practical tools that are based on individual-level expla-
nations and that target individual actors may be consider-
ably more effective than interventions aimed at
organizations or even whole countries. Organizational
cultures and cultures within countries are generally difficult
to change, and especially nation-based explanations are not
very helpful in designing reform initiatives (Rose-Acker-
man 2010). Individuals commit corruption; effective
intervention on the individual level would therefore
inevitably contribute to the dwindling of corruption at the
organizational and the country level.
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